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I Introduction
Once established as a shield that would level the playing field and protect
foreign investors, the North American Free Trade Agreement's investor-state
regime (Chapter 11) is increasingly referenced as a sword that attacks state
sovereignty, favors foreign investors, and costs taxpayers billions of dollars.'
Nevertheless, when President George W. Bush signed the Dominican Republic-
Central American Free Trade Agreement in 2005, it too included an investment
provision with an investor-state dispute resolution mechanism (Chapter 10).2
The persistence of these sorts of investment provisions leads one to wonder:
Are the critics mistaken? Is there a place for investor protection and citizen-
state litigation in international law after all?
This Note argues that there is still a place for investor protection and
citizen-state litigation in international law. Part II examines the layout of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter 11, and the impetus
behind its creation. Part III then outlines the most common criticisms of
Chapter 11, particularly those issues recently addressed in the Dominican
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). It explores
claims that Chapter 11 unfairly favors foreign investors, hinders U.S.
sovereignty, and costs taxpayers exorbitant amounts of money. It also
addresses the absence of an appeals mechanism and the lack of transparency
under NAFTA Chapter 11. It then concludes that generally these concerns and
criticisms are exaggerated and, hence, the problems posed by an investor-state
mechanism are not as daunting as critics suggest.
Part IV moves into a discussion of CAFTA Chapter 10. Part V parallels
Part HI's criticisms, but from the perspective of CAFTA--exploring the text of
CAFTA and summarizing how CAFTA addresses each of these issues. An
examination of CAFTA illustrates that, even if the criticisms of NAFTA were
not overblown, CAFTA effectively addresses them. The improvements
adopted by CAFTA demonstrate that, to the extent that it is problematic, the
1. See MARY BorrARI & LORI WALLACH, NAFTA's THREAT To SOVEREIGNTY AND
DEMOCRACY: THE RECORD OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE CASES 1994-2005:
LESSONS FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 79 (2005) ("[I]nstead of
providing investors with a shield against government seizure of property, those investor
protections are being wielded by investors as a sword to attack an array of regulatory policies
and everyday government functions. "), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Chapter
%2011%20Report%20Final.pdf.
2. The Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, art.
10, Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 (draft text), [hereinafter CAFTA], available at http://www.
ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/Section_ Index.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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investor-state mechanism can adapt and become an effective method of investor
protection and dispute resolution. Finally, Part VI concludes that investor
protection and citizen-state litigation still have a place in international law.
Investment provisions raise a number of issues, but this Note does not
attempt to address all of them. Specifically, this Note is written from the
perspective of the United States Government and U.S. investors. It does not
speak to the benefits or detriments of the investment provisions from the
perspective of foreign governments or foreign investors.
II. Foreign Investment Under NAFTA: Chapter 11
A. NAFTA Chapter I I
NAFTA's Chapter 1 1 establishes rules to protect investors who wish
to invest in a foreign member-State. Section A requires member-States to
grant foreign investors a series of rights. If, for example, a U.S.
corporation invests money in a project in Mexico, the Mexican
Government must grant that corporation "most-favored-nation" status,
3
and must afford it a "minimum standard of treatment," as required by
international law.4 Further, the Government of Mexico is barred from
discriminating against that corporation, 5 imposing certain "performance
requirements" on the corporation,6 limiting the corporation's hiring to a
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1103, Dec. 17, 1992,32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. The article states,
Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment no
less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of its own
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or
other disposition of investments ....
Id.
4. See id. at art. 1105 ("Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another
Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security.").
5. See id. at arts. 1101-02 ("Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party
treatment no less favorable than that it accords in like circumstances to its own investors ... .
6. See id. at art. 1106 (outlining performance requirements). The article specifies,
1. No Party may impose or enforce any of the following requirements, or enforce
any commitment or undertaking, in connection with the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct or operation of an investment of an investor of a
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particular nationality, 7 restricting its free transfer of funds,8  or
expropriating the corporation's investment without just compensation. 9
Section A concludes by explaining that nothing in Chapter 11 "shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any
measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate
to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental concerns."
0
Section B of NAFTA Chapter 11 provides a dispute resolution
mechanism that allows investors to bring suit against a Treaty Party should
that Party fail to live up to any of its obligations under Section A. If, to
return to the above example, the Mexican Government discriminated
against a U.S. corporation, that corporation could submit a claim for
damages against Mexico. In order to submit a claim, investors must meet
certain conditions." Section B directs investors who meet these conditions
Party or of a non-Party in its territory: (a) to export a given level or percentage of
goods or services; (b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services provided
in its territory, or to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory; (d) to
relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports
or to the amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such investment;
(e) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment
produces or provides by relating such sales in any way to the volume or value of its
exports or foreign exchange earnings; (f) to transfer technology, a production
process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its territory, except when the
requirement is imposed or the commitment; (g) to act as the exclusive supplier of
the goods it produces or services it provides to a specific region or world
market ....
Id.
7. See id. at art. 1107 ("No Party may require that an enterprise of that Party that is an
investment of an investor of another Party appoint to senior management positions individuals
of any particular nationality ....").
8. See id. at art. 1109 ("Each Party shall permit all transfers relating to an investment of
an investor of another Party in the territory of the Party to be made freely and without
delay .... ).
9. See id. at art. 1110. The article explains:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of
an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ('expropriation'), except:
(a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with
due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation in
accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.
Id.
10. Id. atart. 1114.
11. See id. at art. 1121 (listing the conditions required to submit a claim). The conditions
are as follows:
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to submit their claims to binding international arbitration through the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
Convention Rules, 2 the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, 3 or the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
14
1. A disputing investor may submit a claim under Article 1116 to arbitration only
if: (a) the investor consents to arbitration in accordance with the procedures set out
in this Agreement; and (b) the investor and, where the claim is for loss or damage
to an interest in an enterprise of another Party that is a juridical person that the
investor owns or controls directly or indirectly, the enterprise, waive their right to
initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any
Party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the
measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach referred to in Article
1116, except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary
relief, not involving the payment of damages, before an administrative tribunal or
court under the law of the disputing Party. 2. A disputing investor may submit a
claim under Article 1117 to arbitration only if both the investor and the enterprise:
(a) consent to arbitration in accordance with the procedures set out in this
Agreement; and (b) waive their right to initiate or continue before any
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or other dispute
settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing
Party that is alleged to be a breach referred to in Article 1117, except for
proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not involving
the payment of damages, before an administrative tribunal or court under the law of
the disputing Party.
Id.
12. See Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], ICSID Convention
Regulations and Rules (Jan. 2003), [hereinafter ICSID Convention Rules] (establishing rules for
arbitrations tried through the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdocbasicdoc.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). ICSID is an autonomous international organization
"with close links to the world bank." See ICSID, About ICSID, http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/about/about.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, which came into effect in 1966, created ICSID. Id. Currently neither
Mexico nor Canada are Parties to the Convention; hence, in practice, the ICSID Convention
Rules are not a true option. Id. If Parties elect to proceed under ICSID, they must do so under
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, which were designed for proceedings that fall outside the
scope of the Convention. Id.
13. See ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility Rules, art. 53(3) (2003), [hereinafter ICSID
Additional Facility Rules] (establishing Rules for arbitrations that fall outside the scope of the
ICSID Convention), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm (last visited Sept. 13,
2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
(1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules] (outlining arbitration Rules for The United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)), www.uncitral.orgpdf/english/
texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf. The General Assembly of the United Nations
established UNCITRAL through Resolution 2205(XXI) of 17 December 1966. See
UNCITRAL, Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.
org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) (listing facts about establishment
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Arbitration Rules."5 ICSID and UNCITRAL are existing international
bodies that establish procedures for ad hoc arbitration of international
commercial and investment disputes.16 Each ad hoc tribunal "shall comprise
three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each of the disputing parties and
the third, who shall be the presiding arbitrator, appointed by agreement of the
disputing parties.' 7 Unless the Parties agree otherwise, arbitrations will be
held "in the territory of a Party that is a party to the New York Convention '" 8 in
accordance with the ICSID or UNCITRAL rules.' 9  Under the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules, the arbitral tribunal will determine the place of
arbitration "after consultation with the parties and the Secretariat.
'" 20
UNCITRAL provides that the arbitral tribunal will determine the place of
arbitration, "having regard to the circumstances of the arbitration."
21
Once the tribunal is set up, the arbitrators will decide the issues in dispute
in accordance with NAFTA and applicable rules of international law.22 The
NAFTA Commission's interpretations likewise bind the tribunal.23 If the
tribunal determines that the defending Party violated NAFTA, it may award
monetary damages and applicable interest or restitution of property to the
investor.24 Arbitral awards have no precedential value and only bind the parties
in the case.
25
and members of UNCITRAL) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The United
States, Canada, and Mexico are all members of UNCITRAL. Id.
15. See NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1120 ("[A] disputing investor may submit the claim
to arbitration under: (c) the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.").
16. See ICSID Convention Rules, supra note 12, at Introduction ("In accordance with the
provisions of the Convention, ICSID provides facilities for conciliation and arbitration of
investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States."); see
also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 14, at Preface ("The General Assembly...
recommends the use of the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law in the settlement of disputes arising in the context of international
commercial relations.").
17. NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1123.
18. Id. at art. 1130 (referring to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517).
19. See id. at art. 1130 (requiring the place of arbitration to be chosen in accordance with
ICSID and UNCITRAL).
20. ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 13, at art. 21(1).
21. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 14, at art. 16(1).
22. See NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1131(1) (providing recommendations for applying
international law).
23. See id. at arts. 1131-32 (providing guidance for interpreting annexes to NAFTA).
24. See id. at art. 1135 (explaining the forms of final arbitration awards).
25. See id. at art. 1136 (containing provisions on finality and enforcement of awards).
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NAFTA does not provide an appellate body for arbitral awards;
however, parties may initiate proceedings to revise, set aside, or annul the
award.26 In practice, review proceedings take place in domestic courts
under the domestic law of the place of arbitration, as provided by
UNCITRAL and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules." If Mexico and
Canada were parties to the ICSID Convention, decisions rendered under
28 aadithat body would be reviewed by the ad hoc committee. Once the award is
final, investors may seek to enforce the award under the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States,29 the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards30 (New York Convention), or the
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration3'
(Inter-American Convention).32
26. See Patricia Isela Hansen, Judicialization and Globalization in the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 489, 498 (2003) (discussing parties' post judgment
options).
27. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Model Law on Int'l Commercial
Arbitration, Annex I art. 34, June 21, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985) (referring to "recourse to a
court against an arbitral award made" in the territory of this State under this Law).
28. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 52(3), Mar. 8, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes] ("On receipt of the request the Chairman shall forthwith
appoint from the Panel of Arbitrators an ad hoc Committee of three persons."). The Convention
continues:
None of the members of the Committee shall have been a member of the Tribunal
which rendered the award, shall be of the same nationality as any such member,
shall be a national of the State party to the dispute or of the State whose national is
a party to the dispute, shall have been designated to the Panel of Arbitrators by
either of those States, or shall have acted as a conciliator in the same dispute.
Id.
29. See id. (explaining the administrative processes for enforcement under the
Convention).
30. See U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
arts. I-Ill, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 ("This Convention shall apply to the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought.... ").
3 1. See Inter-American Convention on Int'l Commercial Arbitration, arts. 1-3, Jan. 30,
1975, 1438 U.N.T.S. 249 ("An agreement in which the parties undertake to submit to arbitral
decision any differences that may arise or have arisen between them with respect to a
commercial transaction is valid.").
32. See NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1136(6) ("A disputing investor may seek
enforcement of an arbitration award under ... the Inter-American Convention....").
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B. The Development of Chapter 11
While many people think of NAFTA's Chapter 11 as a novel provision,
33
the investor dispute resolution mechanism was foreshadowed by a series of
developments in trade law beginning in the 1950s.34 Prior to World War II,
only sovereign nations had legal personalities in international fora.35 Private
parties did not have standing to bring claims.36 The only way for a private party
to redress an injury by a foreign government was to petition his home state to
file a claim on his behalf.
37
However, as direct foreign investment multiplied in the 1950s and 1960s,
the state-state dispute resolution method became increasingly unsatisfactory.
Sovereign states were not always willing to pursue a claim against a foreign
government, even if to do so would be in the interest of an individual citizen.38
Even when a state did pursue a claim, the sovereign was apt to approach the
dispute from its own perspective, rather than as a disinterested advocate of the
investor.39 Hence, in practice, private parties did not always have meaningful
33. See Vincent L. Frakes, NAFTA's Chapter 11 as a Judicial Vehicle for the Expansion
of Investor Rights, 1 Bus. L. BRIEF (AM. U.) 49 (2005) ("Chapter 11 ofthe North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) established novel rules governing disputes between investors and
member countries."); see also Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International
Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029,2163 (2004) (referring to the "novel setting
of Chapter 11").
34. See Barton Legum, The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA, 43
HARV. INT'L L.J. 531, 534-37 (2002) (explaining how earlier developments in international law
foreshadowed the creation of NAFTA Chapter 11).
35. See Ren6 Lettow Lerner, International Pressure To Harmonize: The US. Civil
Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REv. 229, 244 (2001) (providing a
history of international legal personality).
36. See id. ("The ability of a private party to sue a foreign government directly is
relatively recent in international law.").
37. See id. ("If a state's national were [to be] injured by the acts of a foreign government,
only the state itself could bring a claim, acting on its national's behalf.").
38. See Glen T. Schleyer, Power To The People: Allowing Private Parties To Raise
Claims Before The WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAm L. REv. 2275, 2297 (1997)
(explaining why a nation might not want to raise a valid claim on behalf of one of its
constituents). Schleyer lists several examples:
[A]s one commentator notes, a nation might not want to repeat [a private party's]
point if doing so could undermine the government in another... case or in
domestic litigation. In addition, every nation has constituents with varying
interests, and the government cannot possibly represent all of their interests, no
matter how well-intentioned and responsive it is.
Id.
39. See id. ("[A] nation's responsiveness to its constituents will be balanced against its
desire to maintain amicable relations with its trading partners, especially those with significant
political and economic power.").
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recourse against a foreign nation.4° By the 1970s, developing countries had
begun to habitually expropriate foreign investments without always
compensating investors.'
Under these conditions, capital-exporting countries-particularly the
42United States-became convinced that investors needed stronger protection.
This protection came in the form of a series of Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs), which granted investors a private right of action in an investor-state
dispute resolution mechanism.4 3 Beginning in the 1980s, the United States
entered a large number of BITs with different nations. 44  Like previous
investment treaties,45 BITs established traditional investor protections by
imposing national, most-favored-nation, or other specified treaty standards on a
host country's regulation of foreign investment, and by granting investors rights
with respect to nationalization, expropriation, payments, and financial
transfers. 46  However, BITs did not rely on traditional state-state dispute
40. See Ray C. Jones, Note & Comment, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute
Resolution: A Shield to be Embraced or a Sword to be Feared?, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 527,529
(2002) ("Unfortunately for investors, the home government was under no obligation to bring the
claim, and few investors were able to obtain relief.").
41. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment
Regime, 19 MiCH. J. INT'L L. 373, 385 (1998) ("[B]y the 1970s, many developing states were
more skeptical about the value of foreign investment and, in the name of Marxism or
nationalism or both, expropriated major foreign investments in their territories."); see also Alan
0. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and
Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 643 (2005) ("During the middle of the twentieth century...
various developing countries began to question whether customary law obliged them to provide
'prompt, adequate and effective compensation' for expropriation.").
42. See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on
Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT'L TAx & Bus. LAW. 105, 110
(1986) (explaining that the Legal Advisor's Office of the U.S. State Department recommended
broadening treaty ties in order to promote stable legal standards for U.S. investment in the Third
World); see also Jake A. Baccari, Comment, The Loewen Claim: A Creative Use of NAFTA's
Chapter 11, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 465,473 (2003) ("The United States has advocated
these provisions in large part because of fear of foreign expropriation of U.S. investor assets
abroad.").
43. See Gudgeon, supra note 42, at 109-10 (noting that BITs went "beyond [their]
predecessors by also providing for the resolution of investor-host country disputes through
binding arbitration").
44. See David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to
The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 679, 693 (2004)
("[M]ore than forty U.S. BITs concluded beginning in the early 1980s.").
45. See Gudgeon, supra note 42, at 107-08 (discussing FCN treaties). Prior to the
development of BITs, the United States government entered into a series of "Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" (FCNs). These treaties provided investor protections
like those in the BITs, but did not grant investors a private right of action.
46. See Gantz, supra note 44, at 693 (listing traditional provisions of a BIT).
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resolution to enforce these protections. Rather, they established a system based
on investor-state dispute resolution.47
NAFTA Chapter 11 is, in essence, a BIT contained within a trade
agreement. Chapter 11 mirrors the investor protections espoused in BITs and
adopts the BITs' investor-state dispute resolution mechanism. Although
NAFTA primarily concerns trade, the United States advocated the inclusion of
an investor-state dispute resolution mechanism because of concerns about
investment expropriations by the Mexican Government.48 Because their
creation was prompted by similar concerns, it makes sense that NAFTA
Chapter 11 and earlier BITs contain equivalent provisions. One author went so
far as to describe Chapter 11 as "a U.S. bilateral investment treaty on steroids-
a dream come true for the U.S. foreign investor.
4 9
III. Criticisms of NAFTA's Investment Provision
Although NAFTA Chapter 11 did not deviate much from earlier BITs,
critics question the wisdom of extending the investor-state dispute resolution
mechanism into NAFTA.50 Critics are concerned about certain effects they see
stemming from the inclusion of a private right of action for investors such as
greater rights for foreign investors, diminished sovereignty of the member-
Parties, and high costs for taxpayers. Additionally, critics have expressed
concern about the manner in which suits are handled under NAFTA-
specifically, the ad hoc nature of the tribunals and the lack of transparency in
the proceedings. This Part examines each of these concerns in turn. It
concludes that many of the concerns about NAFTA Chapter 11 are
47. See, e.g., Benjamin Klafter, International Commercial Arbitration as Appellate
Review: NAFTA 's Chapter 11, Exhaustion of LocalRemedies andResJudicata, 12 U.C. DAvIs
J. INT'L L. & POL'y 409, 412 (2006) ("The greatest innovation of the BITs has been the
introduction of investor-state arbitration settlement.").
48. See Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: A Tale of Fear
and Equilibrium, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 43, 47 (200 1) ("Their incorporation into NAFTA represented
an apparent victory for U.S. negotiators, who wanted to liberalize the Mexican investment
regime, protect U.S. investors from expropriation, and remove investor-state disputes from the
Mexican judicial process, which was generally considered corrupt or at least compliant with the
will of the state.").
49. Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement's
Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI. INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 304 (1997).
50. See BorARI & WALLACH, supra note 1, at xx ("The investor-state mechanism should
be kept out of future agreements. Commercial disputes arising under the terms of international
agreements between nations should be dealt with by the governments themselves on a state-state
basis."); see also Sykes, supra note 41, at 643 (proposing a rationale for a private right of action
in investment treaties, "a rationale.., that does not apply to trade agreements").
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exaggerated, and hence, the extension of the investor-state dispute resolution
mechanism into NAFTA is not as problematic as critics suggest.
A. Greater Rights for Foreign Investors
One of the most commonly voiced criticisms of NAFTA's Chapter 11 is
that it provides greater rights to foreign investors than it does to domestic
investors. 51 The favoritism toward foreign investors is most often discussed in
terms of NAFTA's expropriation provision.52 Article 11 10 of NAFTA states
that, as a general rule, "[n]o Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or
expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take
a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment."53 This provision is meant to provide protection similar to that
afforded under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law explains that
"the line in international law is similar to that drawn in United States
jurisprudence for purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution in determining whether there has been a taking requiring
compensation. 
54
Critics assert, however, that expropriations claims adjudicated under
NAFTA tend to be more investor friendly than those adjudicated under
domestic takings clause analysis. 55 First, critics complain, NAFTA grants
foreign investors a private right of action against the government of a member
state.5 6 Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, domestic investors have no
51. See BoTtAli & WALLACH, supra note 1, at viii ("[U]nder NAFTA, foreign investors
operating within the United States must be provided with different-superior from the
investor's perspective-treatment than the Constitution requires be provided to U.S. residents
and businesses.").
52. See id. ("Ihe 'expropriations' that have been claimed using NAFTA's foreign
investor protections are nothing like the 'nationalization' or government seizure of real estate
that is generally conveyed by the term. Nor are they similar to the 'takings' cases that have been
adjudicated in the U.S. court system.").
53. NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1116.
54. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712 (1987).
55. See, e.g., BoTrAi & WALLACH, supra note 1, at ix ("Under NAFTA, the sorts of
property owned by foreign investors that are provided with such protection are defined in the
text and expanded upon by NAFTA tribunals in a manner that extends far beyond U.S. law.").
56. See Robert J. Girouard, Note, Water Export Restrictions: A Case Study of WTO
Dispute Settlements, Strategies and Outcomes, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 247, 251 (2003)
("NAFTA's investment provisions give private firms a right to compensation for expropriation
and a private right of action against national governments .... ).
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such right. Furthermore, the right of action granted to foreign investors
extends to situations in which domestic investors would not have a valid
claim. 8 Critics emphasize that Article I 110 goes beyond U.S. law by explicitly
recognizing that an expropriation may be accomplished through indirect
measures.59 Consequently, there will be situations in which an investor would
have a valid claim under NAFTA but would not under U.S. law. Because
domestic investors cannot submit to arbitration in the international tribunals,
the disparate treatment functions as favoritism towards foreign investors.
Critics point to Loewen Group Inc. v. United States6 as an illustration of
the overly investor friendly attitude of NAFTA tribunals.6' Although the case
57. See id. at viii ("[Tihe sovereign immunity shield-the long-standing common law
principle that governments cannot be sued for certain types of activities-does not apply in
NAFTA's private tribunal system. This means that foreign investors are empowered to sue the
United States for cash compensation over federal, state and local policies in instances when U.S.
residents and companies would have no such right.").
58. See id. ("NAFTA requires signatory governments to provide to foreign investors a
variety of substantive rights that go beyond those that the U.S. Supreme Court-in balancing the
specific interests of property owners with the broader public interest in public health and
safety-has ruled are provided by the U.S. Constitution.").
59. See NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1110 ("No Party may directly or indirectly
nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment.") (emphasis
added).
60. Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811 (ICSID 2003). Loewen alleged
that the introduction of anti-Canadian, pro-American testimony during a Mississippi State Court
trial violated the anti-discrimination rules presented in Article 1102 of NAFTA, as well as the
minimum standard of treatment guarantee in Article 1105. Id. at 39. It also alleged that the
award of excessive punitive damages against it in the civil suit amounted to an indirect
expropriation under NAFTA Article 1110. Id. In the Mississippi State Court trial, the jury
awarded O'Keefe $500 million damages, including $75 million damages for emotional distress
and $400 million punitive damages. Id. Loewen attempted to appeal the verdict, alleging that
the trial judge allowed O'Keefe's attorney to make prejudicial references "(i) to Claimants'
foreign nationality (which was contrasted to O'Keefe's Mississippi roots); (ii) race-based
distinctions between O'Keefe and Loewen; and (iii) class-based distinctions between Loewen
(which O'Keefe counsel portrayed as large wealthy corporations) and O'Keefe (who was
portrayed as running family-owned businesses)." Id. at 4. Loewen also alleged that the trial
judge refused to instruct the jury that nationality-based, racial and class-based discrimination are
impermissible. Id. Loewen was not successful in its appeal, however, because the trial court
and the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to reduce the required appeal bond. Id. In order to
pursue its appeal, Loewen would have had to post a $625 million bond within seven days. Id. at
6. After the failed appeal, Loewen claims it was forced to settle "under extreme duress." Id. at
7. In its ruling, the ICSID discussed the merits of the case, but eventually dismissed Loewen's
claim after concluding that, it did not have jurisdiction to rule because Loewen had
reincorporated in the United States. Id. at 240.
61. See, e.g., BoT-rARi & WALLACH, supra note 1, at 26 (explaining why "the Loewen
decision was greeted with great concern in U.S. legal circles").
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was ultimately dismissed, critics were alarmed by the Loewen Tribunal's
discussion.62 In its Order, the Loewen Tribunal found that a Mississippi trial
judge "failed in his duty to take control of the trial by permitting the jury to be
exposed to persistent and flagrant appeals to prejudice on the part of O'Keefe's
counsel and witnesses. ',63 It characterized the Mississippi trial as a "disgrace, 
'64
and declared that "it did not accord with the requirements of due process.,
65
Finally, the Tribunal found that the U.S. government was responsible for these
failures under applicable principles of international law.66 Critics of NAFTA
Chapter 11 understand this language to imply that "U.S. court cases, even cases
heard by state supreme courts or the U.S. Supreme Court, are open to challenge
in NAFTA's closed-door investor-state system. "67 Under the principle asserted
in Loewen, critics contend, foreign investors can challenge adverse decisions of
U.S. courts under NAFTA.68 Because domestic investors do not have a
corresponding right, critics see the decision in Loewen as unfairly favoring
foreign investors.69
In general, claims of favoritism to foreign investors are overstated.
Because the drafters of Chapter 11 specifically created the provision to level the
playing field on behalf of U.S. investors,7° the suggestion that Chapter 1 1
favors foreign investors over domestic investors seems suspect. Indeed, upon
further review, NAFTA's expropriation provisions are not nearly as far off
from U.S. law as critics would have one believe. 71 The expropriation clause
62. See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, The Loewen Group v. United States: Punitive Damages
and the Foreign Investment Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 19 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 495,495 (2004) (quoting Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 53
(ICSID 2003)) ("The O'Keefe case as presented invited the jury to discriminate against Loewen
as an outsider.").
63. Id. at 498-99.
64. Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 119 (ICSID 2003).
65. Dhooge, supra note 62, at 498-99 (citing Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, 42
I.L.M. 811, 830 (ICSID 2003)).
66. See Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 123 (ICSID 2003) ("[W]e
take it to be the responsibility of the State under international law and, consequently, of the
courts of a State, to provide a fair trial of a case to which a foreign investor is a party.").
67. BoTrAIw & WALLACH, supra note 1, at 26.
68. See id. at xiv (asserting that "foreign investors will use the investor-state system to
seek compensation for adverse domestic court rulings").
69. See id. at xiv ("In contrast, U.S. firms operating in the United States do not have this
second bite at the apple outside of the domestic court system and cannot bring regulatory
takings cases based upon domestic court rulings.").
70. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (explaining that Chapter 11 and other
BITs were created to protect U.S. investments from expropriation in less-developed nations).
71. See Gregory M. Starner, Note, Taking A Constitutional Look: NAFTA Chapter I I As
An Extension Of Member States' Constitutional Protection OfProperty, 33 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
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mirrors the Fifth Amendment's protection against takings and the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process guarantee.72 Article I 110 creates exceptions to the
expropriation rule, "(a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on
payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs two through six.
7 3
This language mimics the language of the U.S. Constitution, specifically the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.74 Furthermore, NAFTA Tribunals have
incorporated U.S. case law into their analysis of expropriation.75 Given the
similarities between U.S. law and article 1110 of NAFTA, any potential for
disparate treatment of foreign investors will be minimal.76
Furthermore, many critics' assertions regarding Loewen are fallacious.77
While the tribunal in Loewen acknowledged that U.S. courts' behavior could
amount to an indirect expropriation, 78 it did not imply that foreign investors can
Bus. 405, 427 (2002) ("NAFTA's expropriation provisions most closely mirror the
constitutional protections of U.S. takings law.").
72. See id. at 427 (explaining the similarities between NAFTA expropriation provisions
and the U.S. Constitution).
73. NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1110.
74. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
withoutjust compensation.") (emphasis added); see also U. S. CoNsT. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without dueprocess of law") (emphasis
added).
75. See Starner, supra note 71, at 427-28 (discussing NAFTA tribunals' use of U.S. case
law). Starner explains,
The tribunal in Pope twice referred to the U.S. Restatement on Foreign Relations in
defining a regulatory taking, applying the Restatement's use of "unreasonable
interference" to define an expropriation under article 1110. Additionally, the
language in Metalclad concerning the reasonable reliance on the economic use and
benefit of an investment resembles the Lucas Court's investment-backed
expectations standard for finding a taking.
Id.
76. See id. at 428 ("Taken all together, NAFTA's institutional language and tribunal
decisions represent a consistency with U.S. constitutional principles and takings jurisprudence
that make U.S. obligations to protect foreign investment under the NAFTA a minimal shift in its
constitutional takings law.").
77. Compare Steve Louthan, Note, A Brave New Lochner Era? The Constitutionality of
NAFTA Chapter 11, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1443, 1450 (2001) ("[Tlhe Loewen Group
claimed that the basic structure of Mississippi's trial system 'expropriated' their investment.")
with Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 39 (ICSID 2003) ("Claimants argue
that ... the discriminatory conduct, the excessive verdict, the denial of Loewen's right to appeal
and the coerced settlement violated Article 1110.").
78. See Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 123 (ICSID 2003) ("[W]e
take it to be the responsibility of the State under international law and, consequently, of the
courts of a State, to provide a fair trial of a case to which a foreign investor is a party.").
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bring suit under NAFTA anytime a U.S. Court issues an adverse opinion.79
More accurately, Loewen suggests that a U.S. court can be held to have
expropriated a corporation's investment when it imposes a discriminatory
damage award based on the investor's status as a foreigner. When viewed in
this light, the concern about granting greater rights to foreign citizens dissolves.
By definition, a court could not discriminate against a U.S. investor on the basis
of the investment's foreign character. Hence, a U.S. investor would have no
reason to submit a claim to NAFTA under these circumstances and need not be
concerned that it is denied the right to do so.
Finally, even if Chapter 11 does allow foreign investors to bring suit in
some situations where domestic investors would not have a claim, abandoning
Chapter 11 would not solve the problem. Without Chapter 11, foreign
investors (including U.S. investors who invest in other countries) would often
have no recourse when a foreign government violates their rights.8°
Consequently, there will be many situations in which a domestic investor could
bring a claim but a foreign investor could not.8' In other words, supposed
favoritism toward foreign investors would be replaced with favoritism toward
domestic investors. This Note has established that disparate treatment of
foreign investors is minimal under Chapter 11. Therefore, returning to a system
in which foreign investors have very few rights is an imprudent solution.
B. Hindrances to U.S. Sovereignty
Another major criticism of NAFTA's Chapter 11 is that it undermines
U.S. sovereignty. According to critics, Chapter 11 is not a shield to protect
investors but a sword to attack member-state governments.8 2 Critics envision
79. See Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 119(ICSID 2003) ("By any
standard of measurement, the trial involving O'Keefe and Loewen was a disgrace. By any
standard of review, the tactics of O'Keefe's lawyers, particularly Mr. Gary, were impermissible.
By any standard of evaluation, the trial judge failed to afford Loewen the process that was
due."). Although Loewen did claim that the verdict in the Mississippi trial was excessive
notwithstanding any discrimination, the Tribunal's decision that the damage award could rise to
the level of an expropriation was based on the outrageous conduct of the opposing counsel and
the judge in the Mississippi court, not the fact that the court issued an adverse opinion.
80. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (explaining that individual investors
were often without recourse to pursue a claim before the development of investor-state dispute
mechanisms).
81. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting that foreign governments are apt to
expropriate foreign investments). U.S. investors can bring suit under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments for the expropriation of their real property. If Chapter 11 were eliminated, foreign
investors would not have that ability.
82. See Jones, supra note 40, at 545 ("One of the strongest criticisms of Chapter 11 is that
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investors using their ability to bring suit against the member-State governments
as leverage to deter those governments from passing otherwise valid laws.83
Because litigating NAFTA arbitrations is costly, the U.S. Government could
hesitate to pass regulations that could potentially result in a NAFTA suit.
84
This trepidation could result in a chilling of the Government's ability to pass
certain social or environmental regulations.
Yet again, critics inflate concerns over sovereignty. As Ian Laird, an
attorney with Davis and Company LLP, a firm that frequently handles NAFTA
cases, explains:
Governments make mistakes and sometimes they intentionally create
measures that hurt foreigners. That is the history of international disputes.
It is misguided reasoning to think that holding governments accountable is
a threat to democracy. The real risk is that rational debate about free trade
and investment will be stifled under the weight of anti-free trade hysteria.85
Baird further explains that the image of an avalanche of investor attacks on
state regulations is unrealistic.8 6 Under principles of international law, an
arbitral award should put the injured party in the position it would have
been but for the illegal act of the state.87 If, for example, a country issues a
valid health regulation that pulls an investor's product off the market, that
investor likely would fail in NAFTA arbitration. s If the product is, in fact,
by allowing investors direct access to dispute resolution, the Agreement runs the risk of
promoting vexatious legislation by foreign investors and creating a threat against the national
sovereignty of the NAFTA countries."); see also BoTrARi & WA LACH, supra note 1, at ix
(explaining that Chapter 11 has been criticized for, "undermining the basic public interest
protections... by extending a set of rights to foreign investors operating in the United States to
attack domestic policies and demand compensation for the basic environmental, land use, health
and safety policies under which U.S. businesses operate and upon which citizens rely").
83. See Justin Byrne, Comment, NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Implementing True Rule-
BasedDiplomacy Through Direct Access, 35 TEx. INT'L L.J. 415,434 (2000) (concluding that
meritless litigation could deter governments from passing otherwise desirable legislation).
84. See Jones, supra note 40, at 543 ("[A] NAFTA country might have to think twice
before instituting unpopular legislation for fear of the financial repercussions of defending
expensive litigation against private foreign investors.").
85. Ian A. Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CI. J. INT'L L. 223, 229
(2001).
86. See id. at 227 ("There were many dire predictions in the early days after the signing of
NAFTA that there would be an avalanche of investor-state claims. This has not come to pass.").
87. See id. at 228 ("[Tlhe seminal Permanent Court of International Justice Chorzow
Factory case provides that the injured party be put back in the position it would have been in
but for the illegal act of the state.").
88. See id. at 227 ("If the product or investment is genuinely a health or environmental
hazard... it is unlikely the investor could or would bring a claim .... ).
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unhealthy, there would not be a market for it anyway. 89 To return the
investor to his unmarketable position would not require much of an arbitral
award.90 Hence, it would be worthless for the investor to bring a claim.91
Furthermore, investors are disinclined to bring suit against a foreign
sovereignty, as governments "do not easily acquiesce" to a challenge.92
Baird contends that investors will only bring suit under NAFTA in "an
extreme situation in which the claimant has attempted other non-legal
routes and been rebuffed.,
93
The data supports this contention. In the over a decade since NAFTA
became law, tribunals have only found one case to reach the level of an
expropriation.94 In that case, the Mexican government was accused of
expropriating a U.S. corporation's investment.95 Metalclad, a U.S.
company, invested considerable resources into constructing a landfill after
repeated assurances by the Mexican Government that it had the
government's support to proceed. After the landfill construction was
completed, the Mexican Government did an about-face: It did not permit
Metalclad to operate the landfill and eventually denied a permit application
which previously, according to the Mexican Government, had no legal
89. See Laird, supra note 85, at 228 ("If the product or investment is genuinely a health or
environmental hazard... it is unlikely the investor could ... collect any damages.").
90. See id. (discussing the requirement of making investors whole through arbitral
tribunals).
91. See id. (explaining the difficulties in bringing these types of claims).
92. Id. at 229.
93. Id.
94. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36 (ICSID 2001). In
Metalclad, the dispute arose after Metalclad Corp., a U.S. corporation, constructed a hazardous
waste landfill in Mexico. Id. at I. Metalclad alleged that it initially had the support of the
Mexican government, and that it relied on that support in constructing the landfill. Id. at 33.
It further contended that after the construction was completed, the Mexican government
interfered with the development and operation of the landfill. Id. at I. Metalclad then brought
suit under NAFTA Chapter 11, alleging violations of Article 1105 (fair and equitable treatment)
and 1110 (expropriation). Id. at 1. The tribunal held that "Metalclad's investment was not
accorded fair and equitable treatment in accordance with international law, and that Mexico has
violated NAFTA Article 1105(1)." Id. at 74. It also held that measures taken by the Mexican
government "taken together with the representations [it made], on which Metalclad relied, and
the absence of a timely, orderly or substantive basis for the denial by the Municipality of the
local construction permit, amount to an indirect expropriation." Id. at 107.
95. See id. at 1 (detailing the dispute and claims).
96. See id. at 33 ("Metalclad further asserts that it was told by the President of the INE
and the General Director of the Mexican Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology that all
necessary permits for the landfill had been issued .... ").
1073
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (2006)
basis for denial.97 The situation was exactly the sort for which Chapter 11
was established. 98
Thus far, investors have succeeded in receiving compensation for
violations of NAFTA on only five occasions. 99 Tribunals awarded damages
four times, and settled one case in favor of the investor. I1° All five successful
NAFTA challenges came from U.S. corporations that were investing in Mexico
or in Canada. 01 The United States has never lost a case. 10 2 This data does not
suggest that the United States would feel threatened by a major influx of
NAFTA challenges. There is, therefore, no reason that the United States would
feel restrained in its ability to pass valid health and safety regulations.
C. Cost to Taxpayers
Another common criticism of NAFTA's investment regime is that,
because the U.S. Government is susceptible to lawsuits, the regime could cost
U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars. Critics point to damages that have already
been awarded under NAFTA Chapter 11 as evidence that government dollars
are at risk. 0 3 When the NAFTA tribunal awarded $15.6 million in damages in
Metalclad v. Mexico,' °4 for example, the Government of Mexico was
responsible for paying the award, thus shifting the burden to Mexican
taxpayers. °5 Investors have claimed billions of dollars in damages under
NAFTA. 1°6 Should those investors succeed in their suits against the United
97. See id. at 88 ("The absence of a clear rule as the requirement or not of a municipal
construction permit, as well as the absence of any established practice or procedure as to the
manner of handling applications for a municipal construction permit, amounts to a failure on the
part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by NAFTA.").
98. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (explaining that Chapter 11 was
created to protect U.S. investment from expropriation by other governments).
99. See BoT-rARi & WALLACH, supra note 1, at i-v (summarizing all NAFTA claims filed
to date).
100. See id. (listing cases won by investors).
101. See id. (explaining the nature of the claims in which investors succeeded).
102. See id. (noting United States success rates in NAFTA tribunals).
103. See id. at xv ("Five times foreign investors have succeeded with at least some of their
claims and $35 million has been paid in compensation to foreign investors by governments.
Another $28 billion has been claimed by NAFTA investors.").
104. See supra note 94 (summarizing the Metalclad case).
105. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36, 91 112-26 (ICSID 2001)
(stating the amount that the government of Mexico must pay).
106. See Press Release, Global Trade Watch, New Study by Public Citizen's Global Trade
Watch Analyzes 42 NAFTA Investor-State Challenges; Illustrates How Proposed CAFTA
Would Extend Threat (Feb. 22, 2005), http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfn?
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States, U.S. taxpayers must foot the bill. These damage awards, critics
allege, "could significantly impact the treasuries of national
governments."' 10 7 Critics further complain about the costs of defending
against claims.1
08
Again, concerns over the cost to taxpayers seem overstated. As
explained above, since NAFTA's inception, the member States'
governments have only been forced to pay damages in five cases. 10 9
Canada has lost three cases, and paid approximately $17.9 million in
damages."0 Mexico has lost two cases, and paid approximately $17.1
million in damages."' The United States has yet to lose a single case, nor
has the United States ever paid to settle a case."l2 Eighteen million dollars,
paid over the course of eleven years, is hardly going to bankrupt countries
with annual expenditures of over $150 billion each. "3
U.S. taxpayers, in particular, have little cause for alarm. As
mentioned, the United States has yet to expend a single taxpayer penny on
ID=7366 (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) (explaining that "the growing list of NAFTA 'investor-
state' cases" now "total billions in compensation demands") (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
107. BOTrARI & WALLACH, supra note 1, at xvi.
108. See id. ("In addition, the costs for countries to defend against these NAFTA investor-
state claims-money that could be used elsewhere in these times of pinched budgets-is
significant in itself... With three concluded arbitrations and seven pending against the United
States, the NAFTA arbitration defense bill for U.S. taxpayers may quickly reach over $30
million.").
109. See id. at i-iii (charting cases and claims submitted under the NAFTA regime).
l10. See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, 41 I.L.M. 1347, 1362 (UNCITRAL 2002)
(awarding $461,566 plus interest); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408 (UNCITRAL
2001) (awarding $4.8 million); Ethyl Corp. v. Canada (Award On Jurisdiction), 38 I.L.M. 708
(UNCITRAL 1999) (awarding $13 million settlement); see also BoTrARI & WALLACH, supra
note 1, at i-v (summarizing payments for NAFTA claims).
111. See Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, 42 I.L.M. 625, 669 (ICSID 2002) (awarding
9,464,627.50 Mexican pesos as principal, plus interest generated at the time of signature of this
award, in the amount of 7,496,428.47 Mexican pesos); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican
States, 40 I.L.M. 36, 54 (ICSID 2001) (awarding $16.6 million; later reduced to $15.6 million
by a Canadian Court in United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359, 135
(Sup. Ct. B.C. 2001)).
112. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, CAFTA Policy Brief-May
2005: Investment Provisions in CAFTA (May 2005) [hereinafter CAFTA Policy Brief],
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/BriefingBook/
assetupload file289_7750.pdf.
113. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WoRLD FACTBOOK (2005) [hereinafter WORLD
FACTBOOK] (noting the following country expenditures: U.S. expenditures: $2.466 trillion;
Canada expenditures: $152.6 billion; Mexico expenditures: $175.4 billion), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2006).
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a NAFTA damage award." 4 Furthermore, the U.S. government can easily
absorb the costs of a damage award should it ever lose a case. The largest
single damage award under a NAFTA tribunal was $15.6 million." 5 The
United States government annually spends approximately $2.5 trillion."
6
Given these figures, it is difficult to imagine a NAFTA damage award
greatly affecting taxpayers in the United States.
Finally, the picture of potentially massive damage awards painted by
NAFTA's critics is misleading." 7 Damage awards in the United States
tend to be higher than those in other countries" 8 because of its reliance on
punitive damages." 9 In Loewen, for instance, $400 million of the $500
million damage award was punitive, and $75 million was for emotional
distress. 120 Chapter 11, however, only allows awards of "(a) monetary
damages and any applicable interest; [or] (b) restitution of property, in
which case the award shall provide that the disputing Party may pay
monetary damages and any applicable interest in lieu of restitution."'12' It
explicitly excludes the use of punitive damages. 2 2 Hence, it is unlikely
that there will be the sort of massive damage award that one might be
concerned about in domestic litigation in the United States.
114. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting U.S. success and resulting lack of
expenditure).
115. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36, 131 (ICSID 2001)
("Respondent shall, within 45 days from the date on which this Award is rendered, pay to
Metalclad the amount of $16,685,000.00.").
116. See WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 113 (recording U.S. expenditures at $2466
trillion).
117. See BoTTARi & WALLACH, supra note 1, at 81 (explaining the high costs of NAFTA
dispute resolution, under the heading "Potential Cost to the Taxpayers Could Reach the
Billions").
118. See Lerner, supra note 35, at 265 ("Most countries do not recognize punitive damages
at all. Those that do allow punitive damages in some circumstances are concerned about the
size of awards in the United States.").
119. See Erik K. Moller, Nicholas M. Pace & Stephen J. Carroll, Punitive Damages in
Financial Injury Jury Verdicts, 28 J. LEGAL STuD. 283, 304 (1999) ("Punitive damages
represent a large portion of the total amount of damages awarded (this includes verdicts in
which punitive damages are awarded and verdicts in which punitive damages are not awarded):
from 43% of all damages in other contract verdicts to over 70% of all damages in insurance
verdicts.").
120. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 4 (ICSID 2003) (granting
damages).
121. NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1135.
122. See NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1135 ("A Tribunal may not order a Party to pay
punitive damages.").
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D. Absence of an Appeals Mechanism
Dispute resolution under Chapter 11 alarms many critics. NAFTA
opponents argue that the ad hoc nature of NAFTA arbitration and the absence
of an appeals mechanism lead to inconsistency and instability in arbitral
rulings.123 Under Chapter I's dispute resolution mechanism, investors submit
claims to binding international arbitration through the ICSID Convention, the
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
24
These international bodies conduct investment dispute arbitrations by
appointing ad hoc tribunals. 25 Rulings are binding only on the parties in the
case and do not have precedential value. 26 NAFTA Chapter 11 does not
mention appeals, nor is there currently a standing appellate body to review
NAFTA tribunal decisions.
Under these conditions, critics complain, NAFTA Chapter 11 rulings lack
stability and consistency. 127 Because each NAFTA claim is heard by a different
group of arbitrators who are not required to consider the interpretations of
previous tribunals, there is great potential for variation in rulings. 28 The fact
123. See Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter ]] Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes
of a Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851, 924 (2003) ("This lack of centralized review merely
amplifies the effect of'a system of ad hoc arbitration before tribunals that issue nonprecedential
awards [that create] a lack of institutional and jurisprudential continuity."') (quoting Charles H.
Brower II, Fair and Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 96 AM. Soc.
INT'L L. PROC. 9 (2002)); see also Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73
FoRDHAM L. REv. 1521, 1613 (2005) ("Tribunals are doing their utmost to review previous
decisions, avoid previous mistakes, and harmonize their decisions to create a coherent body of
law; nevertheless, the stakes in investment arbitration are simply too great to sit by idly while
issues of public international law are being decided inconsistently, in private.").
124. See NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1120 (listing the bodies to which a disputing
investor may submit the claim).
125. See ICSID Convention Rules, supra note 12, at Rule 3 (establishing the arbitrator
appointment procedure under ICSID); see also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 14,
art. 6-8 (discussing the appointment of arbitrators under UNCITRAL).
126. See NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1136 ("An award made by a Tribunal shall have no
binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case.").
127. See Jessica S. Wiltse, Comment, An Investor-State Dispute Mechanism In The Free
Trade Area of The Americas: Lessons From NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 1145,
1190 (2003) ("[T]he creation of a body to interpret and apply NAFTA law, and hear appeals
from the various dispute resolution mechanisms, including Chapter 11, would provide
consistency and stability to the NAFTA dispute process."); see also BoTrARI & WALLACH, supra
note 1, at xviii ("NAFTA parties are subject to ad hoc rulings by an ever-changing cast of ad hoc
panelists who may or may not have had any experience with NAFTA rules or prior NAFTA
cases. As a result, there have been contradictory rulings on a variety of issues.").
128. See Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging
Principles & Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245,263 (2002) ("Moreover, precedent
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that there is no standing appellate body to develop an overriding body of case
law exacerbates this problem.' 29 One author refers to the proceedings as a
"crap-shoot,"'130 and complains,
[W]hen rule content is (or is perceived to be) largely a subjective matter,
claimants may be induced to pursue fanciful theories of recovery, or to
abandon plausible ones, while correspondingly, host states may be forced to
defend-perhaps unsuccessfully--claims that ought not to have been
brought, while escaping rigor in cases in which they might properly have
been made to account.
On the other hand, critics often downplay the fact that NAFTA allows for
the possibility of post-award review of tribunal decisions. 132 Although there is
no standing appellate body under NAFTA, parties may initiate proceedings to
revise, to set aside, or to annul an arbitral award, 33 generally in a domestic
court in the place of arbitration. 34 In Metalclad v. Mexico, for example, the
Mexican Government sought to nullify the tribunal's award by filing a set-aside
action in the Supreme Court of British Columbia.135 The Court held that
does not bind the tribunals and there is no general mechanism for appeal. Thus, anyjudgment
might depart from previous interpretations of the agreement and of international law,
exacerbating the uncertainty associated with NAFTA's already vague substantive standards.").
129. See Franck, supra note 123, at 1606-07 ("The goal of an appellate body would be to
provide a public forum for the review of public disputes and create a determinate and coherent
jurisprudence.").
130. Jack J. Coe, Jr., The State of Investor-State Arbitration-Some Reflections on
Professor Brower's Plea for Sensible Principles, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 929, 946 (2005)
[hereinafter Coe, The State of Investor Arbitration].
131. Id. at 946.
132. See Bo'rARI & WALLACH, supra note 1, at viii (criticizing NAFTA's ad hoc tribunal
system under the heading "No Appeals in NAFTA").
133. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing procedures for review of
arbitral rulings).
134. See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Domestic Court Control oflnvestment Awards: Necessary Evil or
Achilles Heel Within NAFTA and the Proposed FTAA?, 19 J. INT'L AR. 185, 186 (2002)
[hereinafter Coe, Domestic Court Control] ("Though anticipated by the NAFTA text, the
ratifications necessary to ICSID Convention application have not been achieved among the
NAFTA states. At present, therefore, requests to nullify NAFTA awards are referred exclusively
to the domestic courts of the place of arbitration rather than to ICSID's annulment apparatus.").
135. See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359 (Sup. Ct. B.C.
2001) (ruling on Mexico's claim). The Supreme Court ofBritish Columbia explained Mexico's
set-aside claim as follows:
In order to have this Court set aside the Award in its entirety, Mexico was required
to successfully establish that all three of the Tribunal's findings of breaches of
Articles 1105 and 1110 of the NAFTA involved decisions beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration or that the Award should be set aside in view of
Metalclad's allegedly improper acts or the Tribunal's alleged failure to answer all
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Mexico succeeded in challenging some of the tribunal's findings, but failed in
challenging others. 136 Accordingly, the Court reduced the tribunal award, but
did not entirely set it aside. 37 Metalclad illustrates that meaningful review is
possible under NAFTA Chapter 11. While this review may not provide the
stability and consistency of a standing appellate body, it does minimize the
"crap-shoot" feeling of the proceedings. 38
In addition to overstating the absence of appeals under NAFTA, critics
sometimes gloss over the benefits of NAFTA's ad hoc arbitration methods.
International arbitration provides a neutral forum for expeditious and efficient
resolution of investment disputes. 39 Without extensive appeals, arbitral bodies
can quickly dispose of claims, saving all parties time and money.
40
Furthermore, without appeals, tribunal decisions will have more authority and
finality.' 4' When determining whether or not to offer an extensive appellate
mechanism, NAFTA drafters were forced to weigh these interests against the
desire to produce a stable body of law through appellate review. The solution
they came up with is not perfect, but neither is it the catastrophe some critics
make it out to be.
E. Lack of Transparency
Another perceived problem with the settlement proceedings is their lack of
transparency. 142 Under Chapter 11, parties must submit to arbitration through
questions submitted to it.
Id. at 133.
136. See id. ("Although Mexico succeeded in challenging the first two of the Tribunal's
findings of breaches of Articles 1105 and 1110, it was not successful on the remaining points.").
137. See id. at 133-25 (discussing the proper damage award).
138. Coe, The State ofInvestor Arbitration, supra note 130, at 946.
139. See Franck, supra note 123, at 1606 ("The beauty of arbitral tribunals is their ability
to conduct independent, expert decision making with 'greater autonomy, control [and]
efficiency' than other available mechanisms."); see also Beauvais, supra note 128, at 261-62
("Arbitration is considerably more flexible, confidential, and economical than domestic
litigation.").
140. See Lauren E. Godshall, Note, In The Cold Shadow of Metalclad: The Potential for
Change to NAFTA's Chapter Eleven, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 264,311-12 (2002) (arguing that
NAFTA should eliminate all appeals options).
141. See id. (arguing that tribunals have more authority without the possibility of appeal);
see also Coe, The State ofInvestor Arbitration, supra note 130, at 952 (2005) ("Finality is in
itself an interstate value to be pursued (even at the occasional cost of allowing an arguable
award to stand).").
142. See, e.g., BoTrARI & WAULACH, supra note 1, at xvi-xxii (criticizing the private
nature of NAFTA arbitrations).
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either ICSID or UNCITRAL.143 Both arbitral bodies forbid publishing awards
without the consent of the parties. 44 Canada or the United States "may make
an award public" when they are the disputing party in the case. 145  When
Mexico is the disputing party, "applicable arbitration rules apply to the
publication of an award."146 Chapter 1 1 does not contain a provision for public
hearings.
47
Critics find the lack of transparency under Chapter 11 alarming because
NAFTA disputes tend to involve policy issues that affect the public. 148 Often,
NAFTA claims implicate regulatory laws.149 These laws are implemented by
democratic bodies and are matters of public concern. 5° Hence, when a
NAFTA suit threatens such a law, proceedings should be open to public
scrutiny. 151 If proceedings were open, citizens would feel less detached from
143. See NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1120 (listing the bodies to which a disputing
investor may submit the claim).
144. See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 13, at art. 53(3) ("[T]he Secretariat
shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties."); see also UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, supra note 14, at art. 32(5) ("The award may be made public only with the
consent of both parties.").
145. NAFTA, supra note 3, at Annex 1137.4.
146. Id.
147. See Gantz, supra note 44, at 747 (explaining that public hearings are excluded under
NAFTA).
148. See BoTrARI & WALLACH, supra note 1, at xvi (explaining that NAFTA arbitral bodies
"are dealing with significant issues of public policy").
149. See id. at i-v (summarizing all NAFTA claims to date, many of which challenge
regulatory actions of the member-State).
150. See Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 213, 220 (2001) (discussing confidentiality under NAFTA Chapter 11). Fracassi
distinguishes private commercial arbitrations (where confidentiality may be a legitimate goal)
from NAFTA disputes (where, he argues, it is not), as follows:
NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations differ from private commercial arbitrations in three
fundamental ways. First, they involve claims by a party against a state that
challenge sovereign acts under international law. Second, they differ from private
commercial arbitrations by virtue of the far-reaching public policy ramifications
that their awards may have for all NAFTA Parties. Third, these claims may have
serious implications for the public purse for which govemments are accountable to
the people.
Id.
151. See Chris Ford, Comment, What Are 'Friends 'for? In NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes,
Accepting Amici Would Help Lift the Curtain of Secrecy Surrounding Investor-State
Arbitrations, 11 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 207,251 (2005) ("Toward the objective of transparency,
NAFTA investors should accept that documents relating their claims against governments be
made public because of the far-reaching impact on public policy and the public purse.").
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the dispute resolution, and the investor-state mechanism would gain
legitimacy. 52
In the past, critics have cited Methanex Corp. v. United States53 as an
illustration of the opaque nature of dispute resolution. 5 4  In Methanex, a
Canadian investor alleged that a California ban on the sale and use of a certain
gasoline additive produced by the investor constituted a violation of the
minimum standard of treatment under NAFTA and rose to the level of an
expropriation. 155 Because the case threatened a law affecting the health and
safety of the citizens of California, those citizens had a stake in the outcome of
the litigation, and, arguably, should have been allowed to participate in the
process. 1
56
152. See id. at 251 ("The scourge of secrecy in dispute-resolution proceedings cannot help
but to undermine the public trust in these arbitrations."); see also Coe, The State of Investor
Arbitration, supra note 130, at 190 ("[T]his cloaking of the process lessens the already diluted
accountability that attaches to independent, temporarily-appointed arbitrators whose privately
deliberated damage assessments are subject only to limited review.").
153. Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (UNCITRAL 2005). In this case,
Methanex, a Canadian corporation, claimed compensation from the United States resulting from
a ban on the sale and use of the gasoline additive known as "MTBE" in California. Id. at 1345.
Methanex claimed the ban violated its rights under Articles 1102, 1105, and 1110 of NAFTA
Chapter 11. Id. at 1346. The Tribunal held that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the claims.
Id. at 1462. Further, if it did have jurisdiction, "[t]he Tribunal would be minded to decide these
issues against Methanex and in favour of the USA, on the facts of this case." Id.
154. See BOrrARI & WALLACH, supra note 1, at xvii (discussing the facts of Methanex in
the context of transparency concerns). When Bottari and Wallach published their article, the
Methanex claim was still pending. Id. at i. It has since been decided in favor of the United
States. Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1462 (UNCITRAL 2005).
155. See Methanex Corp., 44 I.L.M. at 1-2 ("Methanex claimed compensation from the
USA in the amount of approximately US $970 million... resulting from losses caused by the
state of California's ban on the sale and use of the gasoline additive known as 'MTBE' ... ").
156. See Bottari & Wallach, supra note 1, at xvii (explaining the problems that stem from
conducting private dispute resolution outside the view of the public). Bottari & Wallachjustify
their concern as follows:
Under NAFTA these tribunals are empowered to weigh the appropriateness of
public policy matters such as California's rules regarding the reclamation of open-
pit mines or the California law phasing out the gasoline additive MTBE, which was
found to be contaminating drinking water systems throughout that state. Yet, under
the investor-state system, citizens of each state must rely on federal government
agencies, such as the State Department and the USTR, to defend their laws, which
the latter may not support (as in the case of the California mining regulation). The
residents of California cannot be party to the cases involving the health and safety
of their communities and their elected guardian of state law, the California Attorney
General, has no formal role.
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Transparency is a valid concern, but the problem is exaggerated in the case
of NAFTA. In the past five years, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission has
released a series of interpretive statements regarding NAFTA's transparency
problems. 57  In response to concerns about the lack of amicus curiae
submissions, the commission issued a statement outlining procedures for
participation by "non-disputing" parties. 158  Another statement by the
Commission emphasized the possibility of public access to documents, noting
that "[n]othing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the
disputing parties to a Chapter 11 arbitration.' 59 In practice, most, if not all, of
the arbitral awards are now available to the public. 60 Finally, in 2003, the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative released a statement affirming the
United States' consent for opening hearings.'
6'
To summarize, critics are persuasive in their pleas for transparency but
exaggerate the extent to which it is a problem under NAFTA. On one hand,
transparency in judicial proceedings is a well-founded aim. It lends legitimacy
to the proceeding and allows non-disputing parties who have a stake in the
outcome to participate. 62  Nevertheless, in the case of NAFTA, the
157. See NAFTA, NAFTA Claims, http://naftaclaims.com/commission.htm (last visited
Sept. 13, 2006) (linking to the recent statements made by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
158. See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on
Non-disputing Party Participation, 1-2 (detailing participation in NAFTA tribunal decisions by
third parties), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Regional/NAFTA/
assetupload file45 3600.pdf.
159. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, § Al (2001), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp (last
visited Sept. 13, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The document
explains:
Each Party agrees to make available to the public in a timely manner all documents
submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal, subject to redaction of:
i. confidential business information; ii. information which is privileged or otherwise
protected from disclosure under the Party's domestic law; and iii. information
which the Party must withhold pursuant to the relevant arbitral rules, as applied.
Id.
160. See NAFTA, Pleadings, Orders & Awards, http://naftaclaims.com/disputes.htm (last
visited Sept. 13, 2006) (providing links to legal documents from NAFTA arbitrations) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Appleton and Associates, NAFTA
Investor-State Arbitrations, http://www.appletonlaw.com/4acases.htm (last visited Sept. 13,
2006) (linking to documents in several key NAFTA cases) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
161. Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter
Eleven Arbitrations (Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Statement on Open Hearings], available at http:
//www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset_upload file 143_3602.pdf.
162. See Naveen Gurudevan, Comment, An Evaluation of Current Legitimacy-Based
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Commission has already implemented many of the changes critics desire.
Critics' purported concern about the problem is, therefore, unwarranted.
IV. Foreign Investment Under CAFTA: Chapter 10
President George W. Bush signed The Central America-Dominican
Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) into law on
August 2, 2005.163 The Agreement extends free trade to Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican
Republic.164 Like NAFTA, CAFTA contains a provision that provides for
investor protections and investor-state dispute resolution. 165 CAFTA's
chapter 10 repeats many of the standards adopted by NAFTA (and earlier
BITs). 166  Under CAFTA, investors are granted a series of basic
protections: non-discriminatory treatment relative to domestic investors
and investors of non-parties, limits on "performance requirements," free
transfer of funds related to an investment, protection from expropriation
other than in conformity with customary international law, a "minimum
standard of treatment" in conformity with customary international law, and
the ability to hire key managerial personnel without regard to nationality. 1
67
Furthermore, the chapter makes explicit that "except in rare
circumstances, ' 68 nondiscriminatory regulatory actions designed and
applied to meet legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health
and environmental protection, will not be considered expropriatory 69
Objections to NAFTA 's Chapter II Investment Dispute Resolution Process, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L
L.J. 399, 425-26 (2005) (explaining the problems that arise when arbitrations are not open).
163. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Signs
CAFTA-DR (Aug. 2,2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20050802-2.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
164. See United States Office of the Trade Representative, The Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement: Summary of the Agreement, 1
[hereinafter CAFTA Summary] ("This summary briefly describes key provisions.., that the
United States has concluded with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua
and the Dominican Republic."), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/
Bilateral/ CAFTA/BriefingBook/assetuploadfile I28_7284.pdf.
165. See CAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 10 (providing all investment provisions).
166. See generally CAFTA summary, supra note 164, at 12-13.
167. See id. at 13 (summarizing the major provisions of the investment chapter).
168. CAFTA, supra note 2, at annex 10-C.
169. See CAFTA summary, supra note 164, at 13 ("[N]ondiscriminatory regulatory actions
designed and applied to meet legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health and the
environment, are not expropriatory.").
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Chapter 10 also provides an investor-state dispute resolution
mechanism. Under the provision, Parties may submit a claim for damages
against another Party to binding international arbitration. Investors may
claim that the Party breached a substantive obligation under the chapter or
that the Party breached an investment agreement with the investor.
70
Hearings are generally public and, with the exception of confidential
business information, key documents will be publicly available.' 71 Amicus
submissions are now expressly allowed under the chapter. 7 2 The dispute
resolution provision also includes a clause that resembles U.S. rules for
quickly disposing of frivolous claims. 173 Finally, Chapter 10 contains an
annex that calls for Parties to initiate negotiations to develop an appellate
body to review awards granted under tribunals within three months of the
Agreement's entry into force. 1
74
V. CAFTA's Response to Specific NAFTA Criticisms
The United States Office of the Trade Representative emphasizes that
"the Administration... substantially revised the investment text used in
free trade agreements ... [i]n response to the guidance that Congress
provided in the Trade Act of 2002,"'"7 and that "CAFTA is thus
significantly different from NAFTA."'176 This Part examines CAFTA's
response to the criticisms of NAFTA. It looks at each criticism in turn, and
examines the extent to which CAFTA addresses them. This Part concludes
that CAFTA effectively addresses the real or perceived problems that arise
under NAFTA. The improvements adopted by CAFTA, in turn, illustrate
that the investor-state mechanism can adapt and become an effective
mechanism for investor protection and dispute resolution.
170. See id. (summarizing investor-state disputes).
171. See id. ("Chapter Ten requires that hearings will generally be open to the
public....").
172. See id. ("The Chapter also authorizes tribunals to accept amicus submissions from the
public.").
173. See id. (summarizing disposal of frivolous claims).
174. See id. (explaining that negotiations for the appellate body to review should begin
within three months).
175. CAFTA Policy Brief, supra note 112.
176. Id.
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A. Greater Rights for Foreign Investors
In response to concern that foreign investors are granted greater rights than
domestic investors, the drafters of CAFTA included a series of provisions
designed to bring expropriation analysis under NAFTA in line with domestic
takings clause law. 1 Many of these provisions are contained in Annex 10-C.
78
The Parties' agree in Annex 10-C that "[a]rticle 10.7.1 is intended to reflect
customary international law concerning the obligation of States with respect to
expropriation." 79 The annex next asserts that "[a]n action or a series of actions
by a Party cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or
intangible property right or property interest in an investment."18 0 Finally, the
annex explains that, when ruling on an expropriation claim, a tribunal is to
consider adverse impact, the extent to which government action impacts
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government
action.' 8' It adds that, "[e]xcept in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate
public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do
not constitute indirect expropriations."0
8 2
These provisions draw on the language of the U.S. Supreme Court in its
Takings Clause analysis. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York,'8 3 for
example, the Court emphasized that the "economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant," "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations," and "the character of the governmental action"
are relevant inquires in the takings clause analysis.84 This exact language is now
incorporated into CAFTA Chapter 10.185 Because CAFTA expropriations cases
now require analysis similar to that required under domestic takings clause cases,
disparate treatment of foreign investors should be minimal.
177. See, e.g., CAFTA, supra note 2, at annex 10-C(1) (noting the changes to bring
CAFTA in line with takings clause analysis).
178. See id. (listing these provisions).
179. Id.
180. Id. at annex I O-C(2).
181. See id. at annex 10-C(4) (listing the factors arbitral tribunals should consider when
deciding expropriation claims).
182. Id.
183. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
184. Id. at 124.
185. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (highlighting the language in
CAFTA).
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B. Hindrances to U.S. Sovereignty
CAFTA attempts to minimize concerns about lost sovereignty through a
series of new provisions. First, under CAFTA, governments may review draft
opinions before they are issued in final form, and litigants may comment on
them.186 CAFTA also allows respondents to request an interpretation from the
Free Trade Commission on issues that fall under the scope of Annexes I and
11.187 That interpretation will bind the tribunal.188 These provisions increase
government participation in the arbitration process and reduce the chances that
the arbitral award will conflict with the state's legitimate regulatory powers.
As discussed above, CAFTA also includes an annex that specifically
addresses some of the concerns about regulatory takings that arose under
NAFTA. 89 The annex asserts that "[a]n action or a series of actions by a Party
cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or
intangible property right or property interest in an investment."' 90 Furthermore,
it notes that "[e]xcept in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriations."' 9' The annex also explains that "an adverse
effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not
establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred."192 Rather, the tribunal
will consider adverse impact, the extent to which government action impacts
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action. 193 These provisions recognize that the government has a
right to make certain regulations, and affirms that CAFTA should not be used
as a tool to attack those regulations. They will, likewise, make it more difficult
186. See CAFTA Policy Brief, supra note 112 (providing for review and comment
procedure with draft opinions).
187. See CAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 10.23 ("A decision issued by the Commission under
paragraph 1 shall be binding on the tribunal, and any decision or award issued by the tribunal
must be consistent with that decision.").
188. See id. ("Where a respondent asserts as a defense that the measure alleged to be a
breach is within the scope of Annex I or Annex II, the tribunal shall, on request of the
respondent, request the interpretation of the Commission on the issue.").
189. See id at annex 10-C (detailing the regulatory takings procedures in CAFTA and
contrasting them with those in NAFTA).
190. Id. at annex 10-C(2).
191. Id. at annex 10-C(4)(b).
192. Id. at annex 10-C(4)(a).
193. See CAFTA, supra note 2, at annex 10-C(4)(a) (listing the factors for the tribunal to
consider in ruling on whether an expropriation has occurred).
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for a tribunal to find an expropriation in a situation where the government has
passed a valid regulation.
Finally, as will be discussed in more detail below, CAFTA now contains a
provision that allows the tribunal to dismiss frivolous claims early in the
proceedings.' 94 These provisions should minimize concerns that investors will
use the threat of litigation to inhibit the Government from passing legislation.
If the claims can be dismissed before the Government has expended too many
resources, threats of litigation will not be nearly as daunting. Combined, these
new CAFTA provisions should allay fears about investor attacks on U.S.
sovereignty.
C. Cost to Taxpayers
When the government introduced CAFTA, fears about costs to taxpayers
resurfaced. 95  In response, the drafters of CAFTA included several new
provisions-based on U.S. law-in the agreement. CAFTA now contains a
provision that gives tribunals the ability to dismiss unfounded claims at an early
stage in the proceedings.196 CAFTA also expressly authorizes the award of
attorney's fees and costs in the case of frivolous claims.
97
As long as the investment provision allows for investor-state lawsuits,
there will always be the potential for monetary damages, but at least under the
new agreement the government will not be required to expend taxpayer
194. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing these new provisions).
195. See Mary Neubecker, CAFTA Will Cost Taxpayers, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, IL),
July 20, 2005, at All ("Taxpayers will be the ones who have to pay huge subsidies for
multinational corporations and Central American governments."); see also Miguel Bustillo,
Some Fear CAFTA Would Undermine State's Authority, Los ANGELES TIMES, July 18, 2005
("The groups say the administration might again be giving foreign corporations the power to
seek payment from U.S. taxpayers when regulators pass laws that diminish a company's
investments.").
196. Compare CAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 10.19 ("[A] tribunal shall address and decide
as a preliminary question any objection by the respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim
submitted is not a claim for which an award in favor of the claimant may be made under Article
10.26.") with FED. R. Civ. P. 56 ("A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may... move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part thereof.").
197. Compare CAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 10.20 ("[The tribunal may, if warranted,
award to the prevailing disputing party reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in
submitting or opposing the objection. In determining whether such an award is warranted, the
tribunal shall consider whether either the claimant's claim or the respondent's objection was
frivolous.") with FED. R. Civ. P. 11 ("If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing
on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing
the motion.").
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dollars--or at least not as often--on frivolous lawsuits. The ability to dismiss
unfounded claims early on in the proceedings will save money that would be
spent defending against the claims. Meanwhile, the possibility for the award of
attorney's fees creates a disincentive for filing frivolous claims. If fewer claims
are filed, the government will spend less money defending against them,
leading to a reduction in potential damage claims. These improvements to
CAFTA should reduce taxpayer fears over the costs of NAFTA litigation.
D. Absence of an Appeals Mechanism
Although NAFTA critics tend to exaggerate the problems with the lack of
appeals under Chapter 11,198 there would be benefits to creating a standing
appellate body. When crafting a dispute resolution agreement, one has to
balance the desire for finality and efficiency against the desire to minimize
errors and inconsistency. The NAFTA drafters erred on the side of efficiency.
Congress, however, moved toward consistency and predictability.'" When
Congress passed the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act2° in 2002, it
explicitly called for future trade agreements to provide an "appellate body or
similar mechanism to provide coherence to interpretations of investment
provisions in trade agreements.
0'0
The drafters of CAFTA were somewhat responsive to Congress's
mandate. CAFTA has not yet established an appellate procedure; however, the
Agreement does contain an annex that illustrates the member-States'
commitment to developing such a mechanism in the near future.20 2 Annex 10-F
specifies that "[w]ithin three months of the date of entry into force" of the
Agreement, the Commission is to develop "an appellate body or similar
mechanism to review awards rendered by tribunals under this Chapter."20 3 It
198. See, e.g., Ari Afilalo, Meaning, Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial (Re-)
Construction of NAFTA Chapter 11, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 279,280 (2005) (summarizing
the arguments of critics complaining about the lack of appeals).
199. See Coe, The State of Investor Arbitration, supra note 130, at 951 ("It seems clear
given the [Trade Promotion Authority Act] Objectives' emphasis on achieving interpretive
coherence that a measure of substantive review is contemplated, leading to a de-emphasis on
finality in favor ofjurisprudential refinement and predictability.").
200. See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102,
116 Stat. 933 (2002) (detailing trade negotiating objectives).
201. Id. at 995.
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also provides a series of issues that the negotiating group should consider when
developing the appeals mechanism.t ° Significantly, the annex mirrors the
language of the Trade Promotion Authority. It explains that "[s]uch appellate
body or similar mechanism shall be designed to provide coherence to the
interpretation of investment provisions in the Agreement. ,20 That CAFTA
uses Congress's exact language illustrates that the drafters of CAFTA listened
to Congress's concerns and altered their approach to dispute resolution
accordingly.
What is unclear, however, is what sort of appellate mechanism will be
inserted into CAFTA.2° Some scholars advocate the use of a single appellate
body with permanent members, like the one utilized under the World Trade
Organization (WTO). °7 Like Chapter 11, ad hoc dispute settlement panels
decide cases under the WTO.2 °8 However, unlike NAFTA, parties can appeal
WTO panel decisions to a fixed appellate body.209 This appellate body, some
suggest, gives a "sense of continuity and coherence to the project of developing
international norms," and thereby "confer[s] legitimacy. ' 210  Developing a
204. See id. (listing issues to consider). The annex lists the following issues as those the
Commission should direct the Negotiating Group to consider:
(a) the nature and composition of an appellate body or similar mechanism;
(b) the applicable scope and standard of review;
(c) transparency of proceedings of an appellate body or similar mechanism;
(d) the effect of decisions by an appellate body or similar mechanism;
(e) the relationship of review by an appellate body or similar mechanism to the
arbitral rules that may be selected under Articles 10.16 and 10.25; and
(f) the relationship of review by an appellate body or similar mechanism to existing
domestic laws and international law on the enforcement of arbitral awards.
Id.
205. Id.
206. See Franck, supra note 123, at 1607 (explaining, in the context ofNAFTA, that "[t]he
precise form and mandate of an appellate body leaves room for a considerable amount of
debate").
207. See Understanding the WTO: A Unique Contribution, http://www.wto.org/english/the
wtoe/whatise/tif e/displ e.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) ("WTO members have agreed
that if they believe fellow-members are violating trade rules, they will use the multilateral
system of settling disputes instead of taking action unilaterally.") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
208. See id. ("The Dispute Settlement Body has the sole authority to establish 'panels' of
experts to consider the case, and to accept or reject the panels' findings or the results of an
appeal.").
209. See id. (explaining dispute resolution under the WTO).
210. Poirier, supra note 123, at 924-25.
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similar body to hear CAFTA and NAFTA claims would provide continuity and
legitimacy to the resolution mechanisms of those Agreements as well.2 '
On the other hand, CAFTA drafters might be concerned that such a body
would excessively diminish the finality and efficiency of binding arbitration.
The Annex calls for the development of "an appellate body or similar
mechanism. 2  This language suggests that Congress does not believe a
standing appellate body is the only option. If Congress were convinced that a
standing appellate body would best resolve the issues that arose under NAFTA,
presumably they would have used such language in the Act. Under the
language of the TPA, the "appellate body or similar mechanism" could take any
number of forms.
2 13
The debate over the appellate mechanism to be utilized in CAFTA will
play out over time. What is important to note now is that the drafters of
CAFTA worked to resolve the issues presented by NAFTA. Whatever
appellate mechanism is adopted, it should help to promote coherence and
continuity under CAFTA Chapter 10.
E. Lack of Transparency
Through its Trade Negotiating Objectives, Congress demonstrated its
commitment to providing transparency in investment agreements.21 4 The
211. See Coe, The State of Investor Arbitration, supra note 130, at 950 (discussing the
possibility of a standing supranational appellate body, and noting that "such a systemic change,
properly implemented, could appreciably enhance legitimacy").
212. CAFTA, supra note 2, at annex 1 0-F.
213. See also Franck, supra note 123, at 1607 (discussing suggestions for appellate
bodies). The appellate mechanism could take the form of a standing appellate body, but, as
Franck explains, scholars have suggested other appellate mechanisms as well:
One commentator suggests that a NAFTA Appellate Body could be composed of
Chief Justices of the Mexican, Canadian, and United States Supreme Courts.
Another commentator has suggested that ad hoc arbitral tribunals be used to
provide appellate review of investment arbitration awards. Others have suggested
the establishment of an appellate body affiliated with a recognized international
institution to provide plenary review for investment arbitration awards.
Id.
214. See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102,
116 Stat. 933, 995 (2002) (outlining the negotiating objectives of the United States regarding
foreign investment). The Act states:
[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign
investment are... to secure for investors important rights comparable to those that
would be available under United States legal principles and practice, by...
(H) ensuring the fullest measure of transparency in the dispute settlement
mechanism, to the extent consistent with the need to protect information that is
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drafters of CAFTA took this commitment seriously.215 Under CAFTA, "(a) the
notice of intent; (b) the notice of arbitration; (c) pleadings, memorials, and
briefs submitted to the tribunal by a disputing party... ; (d) minutes or
transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, where available; and (e) orders, awards,
and decisions of the tribunal" are all made public. 16 The hearings themselves
are to be public as well (except where a disputing party intends to use protected
information).217 Finally, CAFTA expressly authorizes the submission of
amicus curiae briefs.218
CAFTA goes a long way in opening up proceedings by addressing all of
the criticisms of NAFTA (e.g. no amicus briefs, closed hearings, documents not
publicly available). Critics, however, continue to complain about transparency
issues in CAFTA.219 They assert that the public is hindered from observing the
arbitration because the cases are heard in distant venues. 22 They also complain
that amicus opportunities are limited and that the acceptance of amicus briefs is
at the discretion of the panel. 22' Finally, they are concerned that CAFTA grants
exceptions for "protected information" and "confidential business
information. 2 22  In other words, under the Agreement, certain types of
information can still be kept out of the public eye. 23
classified or business confidential, by-
(i) ensuring that all requests for dispute settlement are promptly made public;
(ii) ensuring that
(I) all proceedings, submissions, findings, and decisions are promptly
made public; and
(II) all hearings are open to the public; and
(iii) establishing a mechanism for acceptance of amicus curiae submissions
from businesses, unions, and nongovernmental organizations.
Id.
215. See CAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 10.21 (establishing rules to promote transparency in
arbitral proceedings).
216. Id. at art. 10.21(1).
217. See id. at art. 10.21(2) ("The tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public ...
218. See id. at art. 10.20(3) ("The tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider
amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.").
219. See BoTrAIu & WALLACH, supra note 1, at 17 (expressing concern over the lack of
transparency in CAFTA tribunal proceedings).
220. See id. ("For citizens who can afford to travel to sometimes distant locations, tribunal
hearings will now be open to the public.").
221. See id. ("[T]ribunals have the explicit authority to consider whether or not to accept
amicus curiae briefs, though it is not required that they do so.").
222. Id.
223. See id. ("It remains to be seen whether this loophole will be exploited by investors in
order to keep tribunal proceedings secret.").
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These arguments are exaggerated. Even the harshest critics admit that the
inclusion of greater transparency in CAFTA was "a victory for all those who
raised these issues with Congress. 2 24 While the language of the Agreement
does not state that the tribunal must accept amicus submissions, 225 there is no
reason to imagine that it would refuse them.226 Furthermore, while
transparency is a legitimate aim, it should not be achieved at the expense of
harming businesses that seek justice through CAFTA. The "protected
information 2 27 and "confidential business information"228 language represents
a reasonable compromise between promoting transparency and protecting
businesses from forced disclosure of confidential information.
VI. Conclusion
An examination of NAFTA Chapter 11 and CAFTA Chapter 10
demonstrates that there is still a place for investor protection and citizen-state
litigation in international law. Investor-state dispute resolution has a number of
benefits. It creates a safe means for citizens of a member-State to invest
abroad. By protecting investors, Chapter 11 and Chapter 10 increase investor
confidence, which, in turn, increases foreign investment.229 Investment then
helps to promote development and increases the prosperity of member-State
economies.
Critics point to a number of issues that delegitimize the investor-state
dispute resolution mechanism, including favoritism towards foreign investors,
impairment of sovereignty, excessive expense to taxpayers, inconsistent rulings,
and hidden arbitrations. However, as this Note demonstrates, these problems
are generally overstated. Investor protections and citizen-state dispute
resolution are not as problematic as critics assert.
224. Id.
225. See CAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 10.20(3) ("The tribunal shall have the authority to
accept and consider amicus curiae submissions.").
226. Since NAFTA allowed the possibility of amicus submissions, two NAFTA Tribunals
have accepted amicus briefs: Methanex v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions
for Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae," Jan. 15, 2001; The United Parcel Service of
America, Inc. v. Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and
Participation as Amici Curiae, Oct. 17, 2001.
227. CAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 10.21.
228. Id. at art. 10.14.
229. See Beauvais, supra note 128, at 294 ("Clearly, the investor-state mechanism under
NAFTA strongly favors investor security and thus tends to encourage foreign direct
investment.").
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Furthermore, even if the investor-state regime under NAFTA were
problematic, CAFTA illustrates that investment mechanisms are adaptable.
CAFTA's modification of investor-state dispute resolution demonstrates that
the enforcement scheme can overcome growing pains to become an effective
mechanism in international law. With these improvements, it is increasingly
apparent that the benefits of Chapter 10 outweigh its potential liabilities. Under
CAFTA, investors are still granted protections and the ability to enforce those
protections but without promoting favoritism, hindering sovereignty, or
bankrupting taxpayers. CAFTA resolutions are open and will eventually
contain an appellate provision that will add a new level of stability and
consistency to rulings. Because the effects of the investor-state mechanism are
mainly beneficial, this Note concludes that the extension of investor protections
and citizen-state dispute resolution into Trade Agreements was a positive
development in international law.

